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PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN GENES: OUR
PATENT SYSTEM CAN ADDRESS THE ISSUES
WITHOUT MODIFICATION
I. INTRODUCTION

The scientific field of biotechnology is drastically changing the world
in which we live. Tremendous new discoveries this past decade have
fundamentally changed the way we think about biotechnology and the
way we use it to improve our lives. Many biotechnology uses create
legal issues, and patent law is evolving to address these issues.
However, because the field of biotechnology is new, the body of case
law is small. Furthermore, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) is rapidly adapting to address issues raised by those
seeking to patent biotechnological inventions. It is important that there
be certainty in the law so that companies endeavoring to invest large
sums of money in research and development are secure in the
knowledge that they can protect their costly inventions.
One of the biggest issues involving biotechnology and the law is the
patenting of human genes. Because of advances in technology, it is
relatively routine to isolate genes and determine their genetic sequence.
With the recent completion of the Human Genome Project, we now
know the entire genetic sequence of the human genome. All that
remains is for science to determine which portions of the sequenced
genome correspond to actual genes.2 For these reasons, the PTO
witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of patent applications
for human genes. The number of applications more than doubled in the
last ten years, from approximately 16,000 applications in 1990 to 33,000
applications in 2000, and in the last twenty years, "the [PTO] has

1. See generally 1 GENOME ANALYSIS: A LABORATORY MANuAL 1-36 (Bruce Birren
et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter GENOME ANALYSIS] (describing numerous techniques for
isolating and analyzing genes).
2. See Leslie Roberts, A History of the Human Genome Project, SCIENCE, Feb. 16,2001,
at 1195. The editors of SCIENCE dedicated this entire issue to the Human Genome Project.
Id. The issue contains a publication of the entire sequence of the human genome. See id at
1304-51. Additionally, there are articles that address some of the issues created by the
at 1177-1207.
Human Genome Project. See id.
3. Richard Willing, Gene Patent Gets Tougher, USA TODAY, Nov. 15,2000, at 14A.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[85:511

granted patents on about 1,000 human genes or gene fragments." 4
This swell in the number of applications for patents on genes not
only increased the workload of the PTO, but also led some to call for an
evaluation of the law as it relates to the patentability of biological
inventions. For example, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
recently expressed the need for a better understanding of the science
behind human genes and its relationship with the law.5 In a rare appeal,
Justice Breyer said, "'Rapid developments in genetic research have led
to calls for legal change, namely [in] patent law ....But what about
granting patents on mere gene fragment [or] for the isolation of cell
membrane receptors? I'm frightened to death as I approach words like
that."' 6 Justice Breyer called for an "'ongoing conversation"' among
lawyers, economists, scientists, and the biotechnology industry that will
instruct judges on the likely impact of future court decisions.7 He
further identified "'the patenting of genes"' as the area of law where the
need for this conversationwas greatest.8 While the U.S. Supreme Court
has decided few major cases involving gene patents, Justice Breyer
obviously anticipates more cases in the future. Many molecular
biologists might consider the Justice's fear of patents on gene fragments
or cell membrane receptors to be unfounded, but the Justice makes a
valid point in stressing that those making legal decisions affecting these
types of patents should do so on an informed basis.9
This Comment explores and discusses patent law as it relates to
human genes. Part II explains the biology behind genes, describing
what a gene is and what a gene does. Part III addresses the legal basis
for the patenting of human genes derived from the U.S. Constitution,
statutory provisions, and case law. Part IV of this Comment discusses
some of the arguments and problems expressed by some with regard to
the patenting of genes, and it also describes how the law addresses these
arguments and problems. In Part V, this Comment delineates some of
the changes enacted by the PTO to address potential shortcomings of
the law in regard to the patentability of genes. Finally, Part VI discusses
whether the law requires further modifications to address concerns
expressed by those opposed to the patenting of human genes or whether
4. Id.
5. Richard Willing, Breyer Makes a Rare Appeal: Justice Calls for a 'Conversation' on
Genetics and Law, USA TODAY, Nov. 24,2000, at 10A.
6. Id. (alterations in original).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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the law as it currently stands sufficiently addresses the patentability of
human genes.
II. A MOLECULAR BIOLOGY PRIMER

An understanding of how our patent system differentially treats the
patenting of human genes necessitates an understanding of the
molecular biology of genes. All living things use deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) to pass traits on to their offspring. DNA can be thought of as a
"code" composed of four deoxyribonucleotides: adenine (A), guanine
(G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T)." These four deoxyribonucleotides
can be regarded as letters within the code. All life uses this DNA code
to spell out information that ultimately results in the expression of a
genetic trait. Molecular biologists study how information within the
DNA code ultimately results in the expression of a genetic trait.
The path from the DNA code to the expression of the corresponding
genetic trait is complex. DNA is organized into units called genes. 3 A
gene typically codes for a single protein, and it is this protein that effects
the genetic trait 4 For instance, many genes code for proteins that
function as enzymes, which facilitate biochemical reactions in the human
body.' These biochemical reactions ultimately result in the expression
of a genetic trait, and in the case of defective genes, disease. But how
does a gene result in the production of a protein? The DNA sequence
of the gene instructs the cell to synthesize a protein through a series of
complex biochemical steps.
The process whereby the sequence in a gene is used to create a
protein can be divided into two steps-" transcription" and
10. See BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES VI 71-76 (6th ed. 1997). Lewin also indicates that
some viruses use RNA as their genetic material. See id. at 76. In addition, some infectious
agents called "prions" may consist only of protein. See PRION BIOLOGY AND DISEASES 3-5
(Stanley B. Prusiner ed., 1999). However, it is debatable whether viruses and prions are living
entities because they are the obligate parasites, and thus are totally reliant on the cell they
infect for their replication. See id at 3-4; $.. FLINT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF VIROLOGY:
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, PATHOGENESIS AND CONTROL 11 (2000).
11. LEVIN, supra note 10, at 76-79.

12. Id at 71-74.
13. Id at 51-95,135-40,335.

14. Id at 61-63.
15. One such enzyme, phenylalanine hydroxylase, converts the amino acid
phenylalanine to tyrosine, and those with a mutant gene that produces an enzyme incapable
of this metabolic conversion have the disease called "phenylketonuria" or PKU. This defect
results in a toxic accumulation of phenylalanine within the body, and mental retardation can
result. Id. at51.
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"translation."' 6 During transcription, the sequence within the DNA is
used to create a copy composed of ribonucleic acid (RNA). 7 RNA is
similar to DNA except that RNA is composed of ribonucleotides rather
than deoxyribonucleotides, and RNA uses uracil (U) in place of
thymine (T)." This RNA copy of the gene serves as a template for the
process of translation-the next step in the production of a protein from
a gene.'9 During translation, the body's cellular machinery reads the
RNA sequence, which then produces a protein based on this sequence.'
Once a protein is synthesized and becomes functional, it can catalyze
important biochemical reactions within the cell. These reactions
ultimately result in a genetic trait.
Proteins are composed of amino acids, and a protein can be viewed
as a long chain of different amino acids." One protein differs from
another based on the sequence of amino acids, and it is this sequence of
amino acids that determines the protein's ultimate function.'
As
mentioned, RNA is comprised of four different nucleotides (A,G,C,U);
in contrast, proteins may be comprised of as many as twenty different
amino acids.' How can these four nucleotides be used to indicate
twenty amino acids? The answer is that the four nucleotides are actually
read in triplets to indicate a particular amino acid.24 Because they are
read in triplets, there are over sixty-four different possible
combinations.' Further, because there are more possible triplets than
amino acids, more than one triplet can specify a particular amino acid.2
Therefore, there is redundancy in the genetic code.' For example, one
amino acid, leucine, can be specified by six different triplets.'
Obviously, this primer is not meant to give the reader a
comprehensive understanding of molecular biology, but the reader
should recognize one important principle: while genetic traits can have

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
2223.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 179-212,287-334.
Id at 287-334.
Id at 76.
Id. at 153-78.
Id.
Id. at 8-13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 86-88, 213-15.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213-15.
See id.
Id. at 214.
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severe repercussions, especially when they result in disease, they all
have a basis in a DNA code that is very simple-four different
molecules that are linked in a composition that is a gene.

m. LEGAL BASIS FOR PATENTING HUMAN GENES
A patentee has the right to exclude others from using the claimed
invention and thus permits the patentee to create a monopoly.29 While
the right to create a monopoly runs counter to our nation's longstanding
economic policy-most visibly embodied in the Sherman Antitrust
Act-the drafters of the U.S. Constitution recognized that an inventor
should have the right to patent his invention.'
For instance, the
Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."' While our forefathers did not likely foresee the
advances witnessed in science, the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 as permitting Congress to allow
a broad range of subject matter that may be patented.3 3 The Patent Act
of 1952 sets forth the requirements to obtain a patent and the rights of
the patentee.' In particular, section 101 indicates what subject matter is
patentable by stating that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."35 Consequently,
the PTO not only permits patents for genes, but also for other life in the
form of bacteria3' plants,37 and even mammals.3 The rapid proliferation
29. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
31. THE FEDERALIST, No. 43, at 294 (James Madison) (1947) (stating that "The right to
useful inventions seems... to belong to the inventors.").
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[t]he Committee
Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that Congress intended statutory
subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'" 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980) (citing S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394-2428;
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
34. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
35. Id. § 101.
36. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,259,444 (issued Mar. 31, 1981). Chakrabarty's patent on
oil-degrading bacteria is probably the most famous bacteria patent because it did not issue
until after a protracted court battle that ultimately led to the Supreme Court's monumental
holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (1980).

37. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. PP4,278 (issued July 11, 1978) (patent on a miniature rose
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of patents for genes leads some to question whether the PTO should

impose more restrictive requirements before issuing patents for genes or
whether it should issue patents for genes at all.39
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PATENTING OF HUMAN GENES

There are numerous arguments against the patenting of human
genes. 0 This Comment divides these arguments into three broad
categories: (A) legal arguments, (B) policy arguments, and (C) ethical
arguments.41 The legal arguments are based on interpretations of the
Constitution, the Patent Act, and applicable case law. The policy
arguments are based on the perceived goals of our patent system.
Finally, ethical arguments are based on the author's feelings about the
nature of genes and how genes contribute to what makes us human.
A. Legal Arguments

As stated in Part III, the origin of patent rights is in the U.S.
Constitution at Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, which states that
"Congress shall have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Science

and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '
Congress exercised this power by passing the Patent Act. 3 Under the
Patent Act, a patent gives one the right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, or importing the patented invention in the United Statese
"beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years
from the date on which the application for the patent was filed."45
plant).
38. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,175,384 (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (patent on a transgenic
mouse).
39. See Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and
EnvironmentalEthics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 267,286-87 (1995).
40. Many of the arguments presented in this Comment were offered in response to a
request for comments by the PTO in regard to its "Revised Interim Utility Examination
Guidelines." See Public Comments on the United States Patent and Trademark Office
"Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines," 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (Dec. 27, 1999). The
PTO responded to some of these comments when it published its revised utility examination
guidelines. 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-99 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter "Comments and Response"].
41. For a similar organization and analysis of arguments against the patenting of human
genes, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genetics and the Law: Patenting the Human Genome, 39
EMORY L.J. 721 (1990).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
43. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (Supp. V 1999).
44. Id.§ 271(a).
45. Id. § 154(a)(2).
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In order to receive a patent under the Patent Act, the inventor must
comply with certain statutory requirements. For example, section 101 of
the Patent Act requires that the invention or discovery fall within a
category of statutory subject matter and that the invention or discovery
has a certain threshold of utility." Section 101 states that "[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor."47 In addition to meeting this degree of
'
utility, the invention must also be "novel."4
Section 102 requires that
the invention not be "known or used by others in this country... before
the invention thereof by the applicant., 4 9 Section 103 goes further,
requiring that the invention not be "obvious."' Section 103 states that
"[a] patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between the
[invention] and the prior art are such that the [invention] would have
been obvious at the time
51 the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art.
Other statutory requirements can be thought of as "consideration"
for receiving a patent. For example, before receiving a patent, the
inventor must comply with the disclosure requirements of section 112
and provide an adequate "written description" of the invention.' The
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.53
The requirement of an adequate written description ensures that the
invention is disclosed to the public before the inventor receives the right
to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing the invention
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. § 101.
Id.
See id. § 102.
Id. § 102(a).
Id. § 103.
Id. § 103(a).
Id. § 112.
Id.
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in the United Statesi 4 The policy behind this requirement is to reward
invention and discovery by granting patent rights while promoting the
dissemination of information to further research. 5
These requirements under the Patent Act raise various arguments
that the patenting of genes violates the spirit, if not the letter of the
law.56
1. Genes are Not "Inventions"
Many argue that genes are not "inventions," but rather they are
"discoveries" which do not require an inventive effort.' Because the
discovery of genes does not require an inventive effort, the PTO should
not issue patents for genes. In the same regard, because genes are
"discoveries" and not new "compositions," genes should not be
patented because they are not "novel," as required by section 102."9 For
example, human genes have existed as long as the existence of
humanity; therefore, an inventor can never discover a gene and claim
that it is "novel."s" Finally, carrying patent law to its extreme, some
argue that anyone containing patented genes within his or her body
could be considered an infringer, because he or she is "using" a patented
gene merely by being alive.6'
To address the first argument-that genes should not be patentable
because they are discoveries and not inventions-it should be noted that
the drafters of the Constitution clearly stated in Article 1, Section 8,
54. See CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.02 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 218 (1832)).
The third section requires, as preliminary to a patent, a correct specification and
description of the thing discovered. This is necessary in order to give the public,
after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and
is the foundation of the power to issue the patent.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
55. See id.
56. Comments and Response, supra note 40; Eisenberg, supra note 41; Hettinger, supra
note 39.
57. See Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1092-93; Hettinger, supra note 39, at
288-90.
58. Hettinger, supranote 39, at 288.
59. See Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1093; Eisenberg, supra note 41, at
725-29.
60. See Hettinger, supra note 39, at 286.
61. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1093. The comment apparently refers to
a concern that by merely being alive, one may be guilty of using a patented gene without
authority as proscribed by statute. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
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Clause 8 that Congress may extend to "[i]nventors the exclusive Right
to their respective... Discoveries."6 2 As such, the drafters expressed no
intent to distinguish between inventions and discoveries.
Federal case law has addressed the second argument-that because
genes are isolated from nature, they are not "novel." An early case
implied that genes might not satisfy the novelty requirement of our
patent system.63 In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the
patent involved a process for inoculating leguminous plants with strains
of naturally occurring bacteria to allow the plants to fix nitrogen from
the air.6 The U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[P]atents cannot issue for the
discovery of phenomena of nature," and "these bacteria, like the heat of
the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse
of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none."6' One can argue that
genes, like the bacteria in Funk Brothers, are a "discovery of the
phenomena of nature," and therefore genes should not be patentable.
A gene is not an "invention" in the same sense that a machine is an
"invention." However, while the Court never explicitly overruled Funk
Brothers,it limited its holding in a subsequent decision.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,the Court held that bacteria, which had
been genetically modified to degrade oil, could be patented.6 The
distinguishing factor in Chakrabarty, as compared to Funk Brothers,
appeared to. be that in Chakrabarty the bacteria had been altered by
human intervention.67 In light of these cases, how would the Court
analyze a challenge to the patenting of genes? A gene isolated for
patenting is not altered in the same way as the bacteria in Chakrabarty,
but it is purified and amplified. The Court has never answered whether
this distinction is sufficient to qualify a human gene as patentable
subject matter, but the PTO in its Comments and Response has stated
that "an inventor's discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on
the genetic composition isolated from its natural state and processed
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
63. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).

64. Id.
65. Id. at 128-30.
66. 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
67. Id. See also Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 726. "[T]he relevant inquiry for
distinguishing between patentable subject matter and unpatentable products of nature is
whether the claimed invention is the result of human intervention .... [As such, a human
gene] should not be patentable unless it has been altered somehow by human intervention."

Id.
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through purifying steps that separate the gene from other molecules
naturally associated with it."' ' This opinion of the PTO corresponds to
case law subsequent to Funk Brothers,69 which "seems to represent the
high-water mark in the 'products of nature' doctrine."70 For example, in
In re Bergstrom, a federal court of appeals held that scientists could
patent purified forms of two human hormones called prostaglandins
because the purified forms do not naturally occur in nature.'
The PTO specifically addressed the final argument-that anyone
who carries patented genes within his body can be considered to be an
infringer-in its published guidelines." PTO guidelines state that the
PTO cannot charge an individual with infringement for carrying a
patented gene within one's body, because "[a] patent on a gene covers
the isolated and purified gene but does not cover the gene as it occurs in
nature."73 However, as scientists and physicians become more adept at
using gene therapy to manipulate and modify genes within a patient's
body, the courts may test this in situ distinction." At that point, the
courts and the PTO may re-analyze what constitutes infringement in the
context of in situ use, although it seems preposterous from a public
policy standpoint to envision a patentee of a gene suing all of humanity
for infringement. Furthermore, patent claims on gene therapies would
likely focus on a process or method, rather than on a particular gene
itself.
2. It was Not Congress's Intent to Include Genes as Patentable Subject
Matter
Another argument proffered by those opposed to the patenting of
genes is that Congress did not intend to include genes as patentable
68. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1083 (citing Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K.
Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1397 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (both holding that proteins purified from their natural setting were patentable)).
69. See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 725-29 (discussing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980)); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958)
(holding that a purified form of vitamin B12 could be patented); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at
1396, 1401-02 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that prostaglandins, hormones purified from
"animals such as fish, birds, and mammals, for example, chickens, pigs, sheep, cattle, and
man" are patentable). This author notes that the court was incorrect in identifying chickens
as mammals.
70. Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 725.
71. 427 F.2d at 1401-02.
72. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1093.
73. Id.
74. For a discussion of the state of science with regard to gene therapy, see generally
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY (Theodore Friedmann ed., 1999).
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subject matter!5 For instance, because the discovery and isolation of
genes was neither possible nor foreseeable at the time the Constitution
was drafted, the drafters could not have intended for biological
discoveries such as genes to be patentable subject matter. 6 Therefore,
in passing the Patent Act of 1952, the 82nd Congress could not have
intended that genes be included as patentable subject matter.'
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty,determined that statutory subject matter under the Patent
Act could include genetically modified bacteria. 8 In support of his
determination, Justice Burger noted that the legislative history of the
earliest patent act, the Patent Act of 1793, supported a broad definition
of statutory subject matter. 9 Further, Justice Burger stated that "[t]he
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that
Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under
the sun that is made by man."" Justice Burger concluded by stating
that the term "'composition of matter"' within section 101 may include
"'all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite

articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical
mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.' ",8,
A gene is the result of a chemical union of solids-a gene is merely a
polymer of nucleotides!-therefore, it can be considered a "composite
article." But can a gene be considered to be something that is "made by
man"? Lower federal courts have held that through the process of
isolating and purifying a hormone, the hormone "bec[omes] for every
practical purpose a new thing .... That [is] a good ground for a
patent."" The PTO follows the same line of reasoning by permitting
patents on genes as "new compositions" made by man, where a
researcher has isolated and purified a gene from its natural setting.m
Therefore, by isolating and purifying a gene from its natural setting, the

75. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1093.
76. See id.

77. Id.
78. 447 U.S. 303,308-09 (1980).
79. Id. at308.
80. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 23942428; H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
81. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308 (citing Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280
(D. D.C. 1957) (citing WALKER ON PATENTS § 14, at 55 (1st ed. 1937)) (emphasis added).
82. See supra Part II.
83. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95,103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).

84. See Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1093.
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researcher "transforms" the gene into something made by man.8
3. Sequencing DNA is so Routine that it is No Longer Inventive
Some argue that because of recent advances in the isolation,
purification, and sequencing of genes," it may take only a few days to
determine the sequence of a particular gene.' Therefore, the relative
ease of determining the sequence of a particular gene should preclude
patenting of the gene because obtaining the sequence is obvious."
However, patent law is not concerned with the ease at which an
inventor achieves an invention or discovery.' For example, section
103(c) states that "patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made."" ° In this regard, patent law is more
concerned that the invention or discovery contributes to the growing
body of knowledge instead of how that knowledge is obtained. If an
invention contributes non-obvious information to the scientific body of
knowledge, how we acquired the information should not concern us.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the non-obvious test
for DNA molecules depends on whether a molecule having a particular
structure would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time the invention was made." In In re Deuel, the court of appeals
stated that "the existence of a general method of isolating [DNA] is
essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific molecules
themselves would have been obvious. "2 Therefore, the court of appeals
appears to be saying that when patenting a gene, the sequence of the
gene itself must be obvious, and the method for determining the
sequence is largely irrelevant to the test of non-obviousness.
4. A DNA Sequence by Itself has Little Utility
Some argue that "because a DNA sequence by itself has little

85. Id.
86. See generally GENOME ANALYSIS, supranote 1.
87. See Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standardfor Gene Patents:
Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 143,
154-57 (2000) (analyzing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) and arguing how the ease
in obtaining a DNA sequence should preclude patenting of that sequence as obvious).
88. Id.
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
90. Id. § 103(a).
91. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1557-58.
92. Id. at 1559.
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utility," genes should not receive patents.9 3 After all, a DNA sequence is
just information that describes the corresponding gene, and because a
gene consists of a DNA sequence, it therefore has little practical utility
and is not patentable under section 101. 9'
It is indeed arguable that a DNA sequence, by itself, has little utility.
However, an isolated, purified, and sequenced gene is more than just a
DNA sequence, and its utility goes beyond the information in its DNA
sequence.95 Countless experiments use isolated, purified, and sequenced
genes. 96 The PTO guidelines for assessing "utility" require that an
invention or discovery have "specific, substantial, and credible" 97 utility.
The guidelines further state that "[c]redibility is assessed from the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. "9 By this measure, the
utility requirement appears to be minimal, and an isolated and purified
gene meets this requirement. 9 Federal courts say as much by holding
that an assertion of utility within a patent application is presumed
correct. In In re Brana,the federal circuit stated that "the PTO has the
initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility
in the disclosure"...[.00 The burden is satisfied upon a] showing that
one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted
utility" of the claimed invention.'' Because a gene is presumed to have
utility and because a scientist could not reasonably doubt that a gene has
utility, a gene satisfies the utility requirement of our patent stystem.
5. Gene Patents Should Be Limited to "Processes" and Not the DNA
Molecule Itself
The final argument in this category relates to the difference between
patents on compositions and patents on processes.'02

Patents on

93. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1094.
94. See id.
95. See generally GENOME ANALYSIS, supra note 1 (listing numerous experiments that
utilize purified DNA).

96. Id.
97. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092,1098 (Jan. 5,2001).
98. Id.
99. See id.

100. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d
220,224 (C.C.P.A. 1971)) (emphasis added).
101. In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566 (citing In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 439 (C.C.P.A. 198081)).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The text of section 101 does not limit patentability to new
and useful compositions. It additionally states that "whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor.... ." Id. (emphasis added).
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compositions are considered broader than patents on processes because
patents on compositions can cover all processes that use the
composition. In order to limit the number of patents for genes, some
argue that the PTO should limit patents on genes to processes that
utilize the genes, and not the composition of the genes themselves."
In response to this argument, section 101 clearly states that patents
shall be extended to "composition[s]" as well as "process[es]. ' 04 As a
matter of long-standing tradition, the PTO extends patents to chemical
compositions, and it is unclear how extending patents to human geneschemical compositions themselves1 °--distinguishes human genes from
other chemical compositions. Further, it is unclear whether this would
actually reduce the number of patents involving genes. On the contrary,
because patents on processes are not as broad-patents on compositions
cover any process that uses the composition-distinguishing human
genes from other chemical compositions might force those seeking
patent protection to effectively protect the composition of their genes.
If they could not file a patent on the gene's composition, they may
attempt to file patents on every conceivable process in which the gene
might be used. This could result in an even higher workload for the
PTO.
6. Summary
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to confront a case that challenges
the legality of patents on human genes. However, the federal courts can
certainly uphold such legality under the Patent Act,'06 enacted under the
authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. To find
that the patenting of genes is not permitted under the Patent Act,
federal courts would likely have to re-interpret the Patent Act and
distinguish the Court's holding in Chakrabarty.'" Of course, federal
courts might also find independent authority in the Constitution that
forbids the patenting of genes, although such a constitutional argument
is difficult to conceive. Therefore, barring any future action by the
federal courts or Congress, it appears that the Constitutional and
statutory arguments against the patenting of genes are contradicted by

103. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1094-95.
104. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
105. See supra Part II.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
107. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980) (holding that genetically
modified bacteria can be patented because it has been altered by human intervention).
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case law and current PTO regulations.
B. Policy Arguments

Traditionally, the policy underlying our patent system attempts to
create four incentives based on economic goals: "(1) incentive to invent,
(2) incentive to disclose, (3) incentive to commercialize, and (4)
incentive to design around."'0' These four policies are furthered by the
current state of the law as it relates to the patenting of human genes.
Before enacting any modification in the law, Congress should consider
how the law affects each of these incentives and whether the law needs
any change regarding the patenting of human genes.
1. The Patenting of Genes Does Not Discourage Invention
The first goal of our patent system is to provide an incentive to
invent."9 In this regard, the theory underlying our patent system is that
the grant of some form of "property right" in exchange for the labor
expended in creating the invention maximizes the incentive to invent."0
Those opposed to the patenting of genes argue that "patents are not
necessary to encourage additional discovery and sequencing of genes.""'
Certainly, even without a patent system, some research and
discovery of genes would continue, but the underlying reasons for
establishing a reward for one's labor, rooted in the Lockean Labor
Theory,"' applies to the discovery of genes as well as to any other
discovery. The Lockean Labor Theory posits that one is likely to avoid
labor as an unpleasant task and, therefore, to encourage labor, one
should receive an award for one's work."' In our patent system, an
inventor's reward for an invention is the receipt of a patent, which
permits the inventor to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
importing the invention. 4 The inventor can use this "right to exclude"
to commercialize the invention or to license the invention and receive
royalties. The "reward" of a patent thereby encourages invention and
discovery, and the PTO takes the opinion that "[t]he incentive to make

108. DONALD S.CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 62-67 (1998).

109. Id. at 62.
110. See id.
111. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1095.
112. See CHISUM ET AL., supranote 108, at 35-37 (citing John Locke, Second Treatiseon
Civil Governmen4 in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Prometheus Books 1986)).
113. See id. But see Hettinger, supra note 39, at 279-81.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
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discoveries and inventions is generally spurred... by patents." 115 Some
may argue that research and discovery satisfies an intellectual curiosity,
and as such, hardly qualifies as labor. Therefore, intellectual endeavors,
such as research and discovery, do not require rewards. Nevertheless,
Congress designed our patent system with the underlying premise that
reward is required, and it is difficult to envision why the law should
distinguish the discovery of genes from other discoveries in this regard.
A second argument within this category is that the patenting of
genes discourages others from performing research and discovery."'
Under our patent system, after a researcher discovers and patents a
gene, the researcher, as an inventor, may exclude others from using the
gene."' When a second researcher studies a particular disease and the
patented gene's role in that disease, it may be difficult to design an
experiment that does not require the gene. In order to use the gene, the
second researcher must seek a license from the patentee, undoubtedly
requiring a fee in the form of a royalty. Some argue that this is a waste
of valuable resources that could be used for research, rather than
royalties, and therefore all human genes should be in the public
domain." This is a compelling argument because it is difficult for a
molecular biologist studying a particular gene or protein to conceive of
experiments that do not require use of the gene itself. In this regard,
perhaps it is better to view this perceived problem not as creating a
disincentive to invent, but rather as impeding scientific progress.
However, this argument is not unique to the patenting of genes. In fact,
one could argue that a patent on any invention might similarly impede
scientific progress.
Regardless, the PTO is of the opinion that "[t]he incentive to make
discoveries and inventions is generally spurred, not inhibited, by
patents. ' 19

115.
116.
117.
118.
note 41,

Furthermore, the fact that there is a limited exemption

Comments and Response, supranote 40, at 1094.
See id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
See Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1094-95. See also Eisenberg, supra
at 740-44; Stephen P. Hoffert, PTO Issues Biotech Patent Guidelines, THE
SCIENTIST, July 6, 1998, at 1 (citing Professor Jonathan A. King, an outspoken critic of gene
patents who describes another cost of gene patents). For instance, Professor King opines how
any revenue generated by patents is largely consumed by court battles to defend the patent
from infringement. King states that "'[t]hese kinds of tit-for-tat court battles have almost
become the norm in the area of gene patents ....As soon as a patent is issued, you can
expect one company to sue another to defend their claims. You have to wonder if this is the
best way to spend money and devote resources in scientific endeavor.'" l
119. Comments and Response, supranote 40, at 1094 (emphasis added).
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against patent infringment for research purposes somewhat tempers any
concern that the patenting of genes might impede scientific progress."
Additionally, when a researcher requires the use of a gene and seeks a
license from the patentee, "[m]ost inventions [including genes] are made
available to academic researchers on very favorable licensing terms."'"
Further, when a second researcher discovers a new use for a patentee's
gene without having a license to use the gene's composition, the second
researcher may patent the process itselfY'2 If the patentee of the gene's
composition desires to use the second researcher's process, the first
patentee must then seek a license from the second patentee, and this
may place the two in equipoise in bargaining negotiations for a crosslicense agreement.'
Finally, while it is difficult for a molecular biologist to envision
experiments that do not require the use of any particular gene, this
difficulty may actually further another goal of our patent law-the
incentive to design around. After all, the greater the need for a
particular tool in studying a problem, the greater the incentive is for
designing around the required tool. It is often said that necessity is the
mother of invention.
2. The Patenting of Genes Does Not Discourage Disclosure
Much of the research performed by the scientific community relies
on free access to information, and some argue that the possibility of
obtaining patent rights might hinder communication among scientists.'
For instance, section 102 creates a statutory bar to patentability where
an "invention was ... described in a printed publication.., more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent."'
This
requirement might inhibit free exchange of information, at least until
the inventor files the application or has no apprehension about failing to
meet the statutory bar.
However, the purpose behind this statutory bar is to encourage the

120.
121.
122.
Merges,

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 163,271(a), (e).
Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1096.
35 U.S.C. § 101. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. See also Robert
Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking

Patents,62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
123. For a contrary view, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patentsand the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
124. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1095.

125. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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inventor to timely file a patent application,'26 and the ultimate goal of
our patent system is full disclosure."
The written description
requirement ensures that the invention is adequately described such that
one of ordinary skill in the art can make and practice the invention.'2
Furthermore, under section 122, applications must be published
eighteen months from the earliest filing date.2 9 While disclosure may
ultimately occur later under the patent system, the system ensures that
anyone seeking to acquire a patent must fulfill a disclosure requirement.
In fact, it is likely that less disclosure would occur without our patent
system, because scientists, unprotected by a patent, would then have to
rely on secrecy to protect their discoveries."'3 Regardless, the incentive
for full disclosure does not create unique issues for the patenting of
human genes in comparison to other inventions, although the written
description requirement is a highly litigated issue that will be discussed
in Part V.
3. The Patenting of Genes Does Not Frustrate the Incentives to
Commercialize or "Design Around"
This author is unaware of any arguments put forward to claim that
the patenting of genes frustrates the final two incentivescommercialization and "designing around." On the contrary, one can
argue that it is precisely because of the patent system that inventors are
encouraged to commercialize inventions that rely on human genes.
Without patent protection, few would be willing to invest resources in
developing inventions that rely on human genes. Similarly, as discussed
in Part IV.B.1 supra, the patent system provides a strong incentive to
"design around" because of the difficulty in performing experiments in
molecular biology without the use of the particular gene that the
inventor chose to study.

126. See S. Rep. No. 76-876, at 1-2 (1939); H.R. Rep. No. 76-971, at 1-2 (1939).
127. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (stating the written description requirement). See also Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97
YALE L.J. 177, 181-84,197-205, 207-17 (1987).
128. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting Evans
v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433 (1822), for the proposition that the written description
must "enable artizans [sic] to make and use [the invention].").
129. 35 U.S.C. § 122. Section 122 provides an exception to this publication requirement
if the applicant certifies that he has no intent to file in a foreign country. Id § 122
(b)(2)(B)(i)a
130. Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 741.
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C. EthicalArguments
Ethical arguments, the final category, is the most difficult to marshal
and address. As such, this author will briefly address only the two most
common arguments against the patenting of genes.
One of the most common ethical arguments is that the government
should not issue patents on human genes because genes belong to all
humankind, and therefore no single group should have the exclusive
property right to exclude others from their use."' However, gene
patents are not owned in the same sense as property is owned. A patent
is intangible property, m and therefore, granting a patent on a human
gene does not deprive humankind of "property" in the traditional or
tangible sense. A gene patent only deprives other researchers, often
attempting to realize a financial gain, from its use.
The second most common argument against the patenting of human
genes is that researchers derive a human gene from a human being,
which violates our society's 150-year prohibition on humans having
property rights in another human being." However, should a human
gene qualify as a human being or a living entity? The U.S. Supreme
Court has offered a potential framework for analyzing whether a gene
should qualify as a living entity. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the
State did not have a "compelling" interest in proscribing abortion where
a fetus was not viable.' While this author does not wish to equate a
woman's right to seek an abortion with an inventor's right to patent a
biological product, the "viability" test that was expressed in Roe v.
Wade' 5 may have applicability in determining whether a human gene
qualifies as a living entity. The "viability" test established by Roe v.
Wade was whether the fetus could have a "meaningful life outside the
mother's womb.'3 Human genes fail this test for viability because
131. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1093. See also Melissa L. Sturges, Who
Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An Application of the Common
Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219 (1997); Hettinger, supra note 39, at
286-87; SOCIETY, RELIGION, AND TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, CHURCH OF SCOTLAND, 1997
GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT-ETHICAL CONCERNS ABOUT PATENTING IN RELATION TO
LIVING ORGANISMS § 9 (1997), available at http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/terrace
aa244/ga97pat.htm#9 (last visited Sept. 12, 2001) ("It is abhorrent that the information
relating to any aspect of the human body should be seen as intellectual property.").
132. See ag., Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347,353 (1906) (stating that "intangible property"

rights exist in a patent).
133.
134.
135.
136.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
410 U.S. 113,163-64 (1973).
Id.
Id.
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human genes are inanimate compositions of matter. 37 Even with all the
recent scientific advances, creation of a human being in vitro from the
entire human genome is scientific fantasy."
However, even if human genes are not viable, some may argue that
patents should not be issued for genes for the same reason that it is
illegal to market other human products such as organs.
Clearly,
society believes that some human products should not be for sale,
although, society somewhat relaxes this policy by allowing one to
"donate" certain bodily fluids, such as plasma, for money. The
underlying concern for this ban on the sale of organs may be to protect
those that are impoverished from sacrificing vital organs for financial
gain,"4 but this policy is not particularly applicable to the patenting of
human genes. First, one can argue that patenting of genes is
distinguishable in that there is not a market for genes similar to the
market for human organs. Second, one may be able to isolate, amplify,
and sequence a gene from a single cell. 4' Thus, a patentee that patents
his or her own genes is not deprived of a vital organ in the same way as
an organ donor.
Undoubtedly, there are additional ethical arguments against the
patenting of genes. Ultimately, however, society determines what is
ethical, and consequently whether the patenting of genes meets our
ethical standard.
V. THE PTO's RESPONSE: REVISED GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE
WITH THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 101 AND THE
WRITrEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 112

Recently, in response to particular arguments against the patenting
of genes, the PTO issued new examination guidelines regarding the
137. See supra Part II.
138. Arguably, scientists will never be able to create a human being in vitro from the
human genome because human life may require the pre-existence of a single cell, or at least
certain organelles within the cell.
See VIRGINIA WALBOT & NIGEL HOLDER,
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 2-3 (1987).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994). This section states that "It shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration." Id.
140. See Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1034 (1985)
(stating that "[A] monetary inducement to donate is so coercive that it deprives some sellers
of the ability to give informed consent.").
141. Theoretically, one can amplify a gene from a single DNA molecule by using a
process called polymerase chain reaction (PCR). See generally GENOME ANALYSIS, supra
note 1. Therefore, a gene can be isolated from a single cell.
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interpretation of the utility requirement 42 and the written description
requirement.143 These new guidelines address some of the concerns of
those opposed to the patenting of human genes.
The utility requirement, as described in Part IV, derived from 35
U.S.C. § 101, states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."'" Arguably, the
PTO previously applied the utility requirement very liberally, but the
Human Genome Project created what some perceived as a problem with
the liberal application of the utility requirement.
In attempting to sequence the human genome, scientists first
sequenced short stretches of human DNA called Express Sequence Tags
(EST) to use as tools for sequencing entire genes.' 45 These ESTs
contained only short portions of the DNA sequence of unknown genes
rather than the entire DNA sequence.'" However, ESTs are useful tools
for obtaining the entire sequence of genes. 47 Because ESTs had this
utility, albeit limited, the National Institute of Health (NIH) filed many
patents for various ESTs in the 1990s,' 4' despite the fact that the
inventors of ESTs did not know to which genes these ESTs
corresponded. 9 This created concern in the scientific community that
the PTO would grant patents on short stretches of these unknown genes,
and thereby preclude others from patenting the entire gene."S For
example, after someone patents the short stretch of a gene as an EST,
this patentee would own the patent rights to that portion of the gene.
Even if someone later isolates and sequences the entire gene, the
inventor could only patent the portions of the gene not previously
patented as an EST because the portion of the gene corresponding to

142. Comments and Response, supranote 40, at 1092-99.
143. Written Description Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099-1111 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter
Written Description Guidelines].
144. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
145. For a discussion of ESTs and patent law, see Dorothy R. Auth, Are ESTs
Patentable?,15 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 911, 912 (1997); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert
P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the
Identificationof PartialcDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (1995).
146. See Eisenberg & Merges, supranote 145, at 13-14.

147. Id.
148. Id. at 2-3.
149. Id. at 18.
150. Comments and Response, supranote 40, at 1095.
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the EST would not be novel.'
Therefore, patenting of ESTs could
create a disincentive to isolate and sequence entire genes, and "'could
create a very serious limitation on the freedom of researchers to
determine the functionality of genes."""
In response to this perceived problem, the PTO clarified the utility
standard.'53 This clarified standard requires that "[a] claimed invention
must have a specific and substantial utility.'s" This requirement
precludes the inventor of an EST from patenting the EST without
providing a substantial utility.'
Presumably, under the new standard,
this would likely require that the inventor know the identity of the gene
that corresponds to the EST.'56 Therefore, this new standard is likely to
protect researchers performing bona fide research on particular genes
against those who patent ESTs to lay claim to those genes of which they
have no knowledge.
However, the new utility standard does not preclude the patenting of
ESTs per se,"7 and the inventor of the EST need not describe a utility for
the EST other than its use in the isolation of the entire corresponding
gene.'m Regardless, because the inventor is required to know the gene
to which an EST corresponds, it is probable that another inventor
already sequenced the corresponding gene and reported it, if not
patented it. If a prior inventor already reported the gene's sequence,
the EST's inventor is precluded from patenting the EST as a new
composition because the sequence of the EST is not novel. 159 Similarly,
the law precludes the discoverer of the gene from patenting the EST for
use in obtaining the entire gene because that use would be obvious'6
This policy encourages the reporting of new genetic sequences while
maintaining the right of bonafide researchers to seek a patent.
The PTO also issued new guidelines for assessing compliance with
the written description requirement of section 112.61 Under the

151.
152.
1998, at 4
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
Stephen P. Hoffert, PTO Issues Biotech Patent Guidelines, THE SCIENTIST, July 6,
(quoting C. Thomas Caskey, vice president for research at Merck and Co., Inc.).
Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1097-99.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1095.

158. See id.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
160. Id. § 103(a).
161. Written Description Guidelines, supra note 143, at 1099-1111.
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authority of the written description requirement, some urge the PTO to
require the disclosure of the sequence of a gene for patentability. 2
Presumably, this would limit the number of patents on human genes and
increase dissemination of the sequence of the human genome." The
PTO refused to follow this suggestion.' 64 Even if the PTO were to
require the reporting of the sequence of a gene for patentability, this
requirement would have little practical effect on the number of patent
the
applications, because the most practical and common way to satisfy
1
sequence.'
DNA
the
report
to
is
requirement
description
written
The primary purpose of the written description requirement is to
ensure that the inventor is in possession of the invention at the time of
filing and to prevent the inventor from claiming subject matter that was
not filed in the patent application.' 66 Courts require that in order to
conceive of a gene, the inventor must sufficiently describe the gene. 67
This indicates that the inventor possesses the gene at the time he or she
files the patent. In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an applicant was not in possession of a gene when the application
did not disclose the sequence of the gene.'6 It was not sufficient that the
patent's specification disclosed the sequence of a related gene and a
method for obtaining the sequence of the claimed gene. 9 Further, the
court of appeals stated that "an adequate written description of a DNA.
. 'requires ... a description of the DNA itself,' it170 and that an adequate

description is "usually achieved by means of the recitation of the
sequence of nucleotides that make up the [DNA]."171
However, the court of appeals was not willing to make reporting of a
DNA sequence an absolute requirement for patentability, and
accordingly, the PTO incorporated this opinion into its examination

162. Id.
163. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1095.

164. Id.
165. See generally GENOME ANALYSIS, supra note 1. There are other ways to
characterize a gene, for example by its molecular weight. Id. The best way to distinguish and
characterize DNA is, however, to sequence it, and because of the relative ease at which
sequencing is performed, there is no reason not to sequence a gene. Id.
166. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822)).
167. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
168. Id. at 1567-69.
169. Id. at 1562-63.
170. Id. at 1566-67 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
171. Id. at 1569 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[85:511

guidelines for satisfying the written description requirement."
The
PTO stated that while reporting "the DNA sequence[] is one method of
describing a DNA molecule[,] ...it is not the only method.""

Again,

the most practical and common way for an inventor to satisfy the written
description requirement is to simply report the DNA sequence of the
gene.

4

VI. CONCLUSION

This Comment intends to impart an understanding of how patent
law relates to the patenting of genes. In addition, this Comment seeks
to explain some of the perceived problems and provide a framework to
analyze proposed solutions to these problems. Under the Court's
current analysis of the Constitution and the Patent Act, the patenting of
genes is probably permissible, and any prohibition on the patenting of
genes would likely require the Court to revisit prior holdings or for
Congress to amend the Patent Act.
The most important policy question relates to our patent system's
goal of creating an incentive to invent and whether the patenting of
genes promotes or impedes scientific progress. If we concede, contrary
to the PTO's opinion, that gene patents do impede scientific progress, or
that the patenting of genes should be distinguished and treated
differently than other patents because gene patents relate to human
medicine, there are a number of solutions. For example, in the extreme,
Congress could amend the Patent Act to prohibit the patenting of genes
altogether as contrary to the public interest, or in a more moderate
action, Congress could create a system of compulsory licensing. Of
course, both of these solutions might impair the patent system's
incentive to invent.
Finally, regarding ethical arguments proffered against the patenting
of genes, society will ultimately decide whether the patenting of genes
contradicts our ethical standards. In making such a decision, it is
important to note that gene patents are not tangible property; thus, the
law should not equate owning a gene patent with owning a part of
"humankind." Additionally, because genes are not living entities, the
law should not equate a human gene patent to a patent on any living
part of a human being.
Our expanding knowledge of the human genome presents many
172. Written Description Guidelines, supranote 143, at 1104-11.
173. Comments and Response, supra note 40, at 1095 (emphasis added).
174. See supra note 165.
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opportunities for us to improve our lives through advances in human
medicine. We can and should use our patent system as a tool to
promote these discoveries to create a better world. As it currently
stands, our patent system provides a statutory framework for addressing
most issues that arise from the patenting of human genes. Upon
addressing these issues in the future, we should remember the old
adage: "if
it ain't broke, don't fix it. 175
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